Borrowed from; BASIC INCOME STUDIES An International Journal of Basic Income Research Vol. 3, Issue 1 RESEARCH ARTICLE April 2008
http://www.bepress.com/bis/vol3/iss1/art6Abstract ‚ This article probes the current status of the welfare state in Canada, including its failure to ensure economic security for all. Historical and current proposals in Canada for guaranteed or basic income (BI) as an alternative model are outlined. These Canadian discussions are situated in relation to broader international debates on BI. Finally, some current political openings for advancing a guaranteed income framework for Canada are explored.
Recent discussion in Canada on the need for guaranteed or basic income (BI) has been lively and widespread, in contrast to many previous years of disinterest in this topic. This important discussion is timely: Canada is a wealthy country, yet poverty rates are high, many lack adequate housing and nutrition, and economic inequality and insecurity is growing. Establishing a solid economic floor below which no one falls remains a great unfinished project of the Canadian welfare state (Guest, 1997; Little, 1998; Teeple, 2000; Mulvale 2001).
In this article, the term "BI" denotes the model advanced by Van Parijs (2004, pp. 12‚13) of a benefit that is universal, unconditional, and adequate to ensure a decent life.1 In this sense, BI can be seen as a relatively freestanding program. By contrast, I employ the term "Guaranteed Adequate Income" (GAI) to denote a set of policies or a policy framework for ensuring a floor of economic security below which no one falls, and that provides a modest but adequate material standard of living. In addition to monetary income provided through the tax and transfer system of the state, a GAI framework could include publicly provided in-kind services and goods (e.g., health care, child care, education, social housing, access to utilities such as water or heating fuel) that would otherwise have to be procured (perhaps at a very high cost) in the private marketplace. Note that the GAI acronym has been employed in Canada in the past to mean a freestanding program of Guaranteed Annual Income that did not necessarily ensure an adequate income or mesh with other programs. In this article, GAI denotes a coherent framework for Guaranteed Adequate Income, and thus is a deliberately different use of this acronym. A stand-alone BI program providing an adequate level of economic security would be a radical break with current income security arrangements in Canada. Although a GAI framework is more complicated to design, deliver, and take up as a beneficiary, it would build on the existing welfare state in Canada and would likely be more politically supportable and practically achievable in the short to medium run.
I briefly describe the current income support programs in Canada and their failure to eliminate poverty and ensure economic security for all. I then highlight the historical evolution and current state of the debate on Guaranteed Adequate Income (GAI) and BI in Canada. Next, I situate this Canadian debate within broader theoretical debates on BI. Finally, I discuss potential aspects of a strategy for moving forward towards some sort of guaranteed income framework in Canada.2
The Canadian welfare state as it emerged in the post-World War Two period3 matched quite closely what Esping-Andersen (1990) called a "liberal" welfare state, as opposed to the social-democratic or conservative-corporatist variations of his famous three-part typology. The Canadian social welfare edifice was designed to fill temporary gaps in the earnings of male breadwinners in a full employment economy, in which women provided unpaid caring work and domestic labour in the home. The postwar Canadian welfare state provided relatively generous social insurance for labour market participants against the risks of unemployment and lack of income in retirement. Universal "demogrants" were also part of the mix ‚ Family Allowances for parents with children, and a universal benefit for seniors called Old Age Security (OAS). The OAS also eventually included an income-tested Guaranteed Income Supplement, providing additional financial support to low-income seniors.4
For those who did not qualify for this top tier of income security ‚ social insurance and demogrants ‚ the bottom tier of social assistance was much less adequate. It offered only minimal, means-tested financial support for the poor, disabled, and long-term unemployed in a manner that was stigmatizing to recipients and subject to bureaucratic discretion. As in many other jurisdictions, the two tiers reflected the gendering of the Canadian welfare state, with primarily men benefiting from social insurance on the top tier, and primarily women having to rely on social assistance on the bottom tier (Fraser, 1989, pp. 144‚160).
Like other advanced capitalist democracies, Canada undertook neoliberal retrenchment of welfare provision in the early 1980s and evolved into a Post Keynesian welfare state (Mulvale, 2001, pp. 11‚15). For instance, successive rounds of modifications and cuts under both Liberal and Conservative federal governments resulted in the dramatic shrinkage of unemployment insurance coverage. In 1990, 80% of unemployed male workers and 70% of unemployed female workers were receiving benefits, but by 2007 these figures had dropped to 40% and 33% respectively (Canadian Labour Congress, 2007, p. 3). An attempt in the mid-1990s to eliminate the universal Old Age Security and replace it with an income-tested scheme, was only averted due to the speedy and widespread mobilization of seniors against this change (Hale, 1999, p. 4).
Provincial governments in Canada deliver social assistance to the poor. In the 1990s several provinces, notably British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and New Brunswick, sought to portray social assistance recipients as lazy and work-shy and therefore undeserving of benefits. Provincial governments across the country used these stereotypes to cap or even cut social assistance rates, introduce compulsory workfare, and champion snitch lines to combat supposedly widespread welfare fraud.5
One significant addition to the Canadian economic-security framework in the 1990s ‚ the National Child Benefit (NCB) ‚ is a federal income-tested benefit paid to families with young children. In one sense, however, the NCB was just a belated replacement for the universal Family Allowance demogrant that had been cut in stages and finally eliminated by the federal government in 1992. Critics have pointed out that the measures to address child poverty reinforce public perceptions that children in poverty deserve help more than adults, and they obscure the reality of generalized poverty within an economy that denies basic economic security to large numbers of adults and families. The NCB has been criticized for its failure to meet both its stated objectives of reducing child poverty and of fostering labour-market attachment of parents (Paterson et al., 2004). Despite the NCB's goal of enhancing economic security of families with children, the proportion of poor children in Canada has remained unchanged since the unanimous adoption in 1989 of a Parliamentary resolution to end child poverty before the start of this century (Campaign 2000, 2007). So addressing child poverty as an aspect of poverty reduction in general remains a big challenge for Canada in the years ahead (Novick, 2007).
Although the overall poverty rate in Canada has come down from its 1996 level of 15.7%, it was still over 11% in 2004 ‚ the same as it was in 1980 (National Council of Welfare, 2007a). Even the extended economic boom that began in the late 1990s has failed to ensure prosperity for all, as good jobs have disappeared and income inequality has dramatically increased (Yalnizyan, 2007). In particular, high rates of poverty persist among economically vulnerable groups such as single mothers, single seniors, persons with disabilities, Aboriginal people, new immigrants, and visible minorities (National Council of Welfare, 2007b, p. 2).
Given the inadequacies of the existing welfare state in Canada, some progressive nongovernmental organizations, coalitions, and think tanks have advanced comprehensive plans for its overhaul.6 These attempts to comprehensively rethink our approach to economic security in Canada have differed in their assumptions and details, but have included many laudable and progressive recommendations. There have also been recent calls in Canada at the federal (National Council of Welfare, 2007b) and provincial (Newfoundland and Labrador, 2006; Ontario, 2007) levels for comprehensive poverty-reduction strategies with specific targets and timelines.
As an alternative to conventional welfare state architecture, models for guaranteed or BI have engendered only limited interest and support to date in Canada. Such models have in fact provoked considerable scepticism and criticism among politicians, social policy bureaucrats, and organizations seen as progressive voices on social policy. Despite such widespread opposition, social policy debates in Canada over the past several decades have periodically called for what has usually been called "guaranteed annual income".
An early notable initiative was attempted in the province of Alberta in the 1930s. Premier William Aberhart, a believer in the social credit doctrines of Major C. H. Douglas, headed the newly elected provincial Social Credit government. Aberhart sought to implement a system of regular cash payments from the provincial government to everyone, as a means of enhancing consumer purchasing power, stimulating the economy, and redistributing wealth. This promise of such a social dividend paid to all citizens proved difficult to implement (Fitzpatrick, 1999, p. 13). The province was strapped for cash in the depths of the Great Depression, and the federal government resisted attempts to encroach on its control of monetary policy.
In 1971 the Senate Committee on Poverty, chaired by Senator David Croll, released a report recommending guaranteed annual income. Croll, in a speech he gave shortly thereafter, described his scheme: using the negative income tax on a uniform, national basis, based on need. Incorporated in it would be a work incentive to ensure that those who work will receive and keep more income than those who do not. The plan [is] to be financed and administered by the federal government making uniform cash payments to all resident Canadians in economic need. Payments would vary by family size and need and would establish a floor level below which no family unit would be permitted to fall (Croll, 1972).
He added that it was important to "avoid a piecemeal and fragmented approach to income security," and to this end he spoke in favour of "income from the federal government, services from the provincial government, [and] delivery of all services under the umbrella of The Canada Assistance Act which is now on the books and adequate to meet requirements". Croll (1972) also saw this guaranteed annual income plan as a complementary program to "three untouchable measures": "the Canada Pension Plan, Unemployment Insurance, and agreements with Native Canadians".
In the late 1970s, a version of guaranteed annual income (dubbed "Mincome") was piloted in Manitoba by the federal and provincial governments. Although few results of the experiment were published, and broader discussion of the guaranteed income approach diminished after 1979, Hum and Simpson (2001) have more recently revisited this research. This experiment addressed whether a minimal income guarantee would lower the incentive to enter the labour market among those able to work. Hum and Simpson answer in the negative: On the whole, the research results were encouraging to those who favour a GAI [Guaranteed Annual Income]. The reduction in work effort was modest: about one per cent for men, three per cent for wives, and five per cent for unmarried women. These are small effects in absolute terms and they are also smaller than the effects observed in the four US experiments.ä[G]iven the small effect on work incentives, the onus of proof is shifted to those who argue that a GAI would lead to an "excessive" work disincentive response (Hum and Simpson, 2001, pp. 80‚81).
Based on the Mincome experience, some general conclusions were also reached on practical matters to do with program delivery. Hum and Simpson pointed out some positive features of the administrative feasibility of guaranteed income.
Monthly cheques or direct deposits that respond to the changing financial circumstances of families in a timely fashion can be delivered. Payment amounts can be reconciled with the tax collection system. Overpayments can be corrected. Adjustments can be made for recipients' special needs, or to integrate the system with other inkind benefit programs such as public housing, student aid, and the like (Hum and Simpson, pp. 81‚82).
On the negative side, Hum and Simpson also pointed to some administrative problems, including the following: the difficulty of delivering it to the self-employed, farmers, and particularly to those who change location or family structure frequently. Keeping track of families that split up or combined and recombined, and calculating the payment that was appropriate for them was a complicated task, certainly more complicated that [sic] anyone initially envisioned (Hum and Simpson, p. 81).
The fact that "family structure emerged as a major issue" (Hum and Simpson, p. 81) also could make guaranteed income a more politically charged issue.7
In 1985 the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (1985), often referred to as the "Macdonald Commission," after its chair Donald S. Macdonald, recommended that a guaranteed annual income scheme (called the Universal Income Security Program or UISP) be adopted, as a streamlined and more comprehensive alternative to much of the existing welfare state. However the level of support was set at such a low level that the UISP met with strong opposition from the Canadian labour movement, among others (Mulvale, 2001, p. 100), and the scheme was not pursued.8
The question of guaranteed annual income was revisited as part of a comprehensive review of social security arrangements by the Minister of Human Resources, Lloyd Axworthy, and the Liberal federal government in 1994. A discussion paper on this topic concluded that "the arithmetic of current Canadian income distribution makes achievement of a comprehensive GAI appear either politically or fiscally out of the question" (Canada, 1994, p. 25). However, this study also noted that "it is important to remember that some of the ideas underlying a GAI and the mechanisms for implementing it have already had a major impact on Canadian income security programs" ‚ citing the Child Tax Benefit, the partial refund on the federal goods and service tax to low income tax filers, and the Guaranteed Income Supplement component of the universal Old Age Security (Canada, 1994, p. 21). The 1994 study was thus favourably inclined to partial GAI-like payments that were income-tested and could be delivered using the negative income tax method. But it ruled out a comprehensive or more generous GAI (particularly one delivered as a universal demogrant, rather than through negative income tax) as "too expensive" (Canada, 1994, p. 19). The study opted instead for earnings supplements and tax breaks to "encourage people now unemployed and/or on social assistance to take entry-level, low-paying jobs" (Canada, 1994 , p. 22).
More recent benchmarks in the BI discussion in Canada have been the publication of two relatively brief and accessibly written books by Lerner et al. (1999) and Blais (2002). Both books introduce the concept and rationales of BI, and address general questions about its implementation in a Canadian context. The original publication of Blais's book, Un revenu garanti pour tous, occasioned a feature article in the QuÈbec daily newspaper Le Soleil (February 25, 2001, p. A5) which was entitled "Une allocation universelle initiÈe par Ottawa, 300$ par mois." In addition, Lionel-Henri Groulx (2005) published a comprehensive review in French of BI-like approaches.
In early 2003, the Canadian Council on Social Development convened "A Working Conference on Strategies to Ensure Economic Security for All Canadians" in Ottawa. At this meeting Sally Lerner of the BI Network "noted that a major challenge lies in how a secure economic foundation can be created for the increasing numbers of 'flexible' workers demanded by employers." The discussion also "raised many important questions regarding governments' responsibilities in providing BI security, as well as social services and resources, to all citizens."9 While BI did not predominate as a topic at this meeting, it was among the approaches considered.
In September 2004 feminists from across the country met in Pictou, Nova Scotia, and developed a "Feminist Statement on Guaranteed Living Income" (Lakeman et al., 2004). In late 2006, a blog posted on the Progressive Economists Forum cited numerous pieces of evidence that indicated "Signs of Life in Canada's GAI Movement" (Dubois, 2006). In early 2007 the Toronto Star, Canada's highest circulation daily newspaper, ran a series of feature articles and editorials entitled the "War on Poverty." This series included an editorial on January 29, 2007 arguing that "regardless of whether it is an objective or a program, the idea of a guaranteed income should be part of the debate on how to fight poverty."10 The Toronto Star series also included an article (Monsebratten, 2007) entitled "Guaranteed Income, Guaranteed Dignity" that stated that "a guaranteed annual income for all Canadians" was "gaining momentum." The National Council of Welfare (2007b, p. 13) reported results of its "Anti-Poverty and Income Security Questionnaire," to which a diverse range of over 5000 individuals and 400 organizations responded. This survey ranked "a guaranteed liveable income" (along with affordable housing, childcare and education and training) as "top actions that respondents thought could make a difference."
No political party with elected representatives in the House of Commons currently calls for the explicit adoption of guaranteed income in Canada. The governing Conservatives are committed to a vision of "open federalism" in which federal spending on social programs is limited, and provincial opting out is permitted in any new or modified programs (Conservative Party of Canada, 2005). The prospects for some kind of comprehensive and adequate national framework for guaranteed income within such a decentralized regime of federalprovincial relations would be limited, to say the least.
On the opposition benches, the Liberal Party of Canada (2007) has promised if elected to reduce the overall incidence of poverty by at least 30 percent, and to reduce child poverty by at least 50 percent, within its first term of government. The left-of-centre New Democratic Party (2008) sees itself as "building towards [a] comprehensive anti-poverty strategy" through improvements to traditional measures such as unemployment insurance, minimum wage, student loans, publicly funded child care, social housing, and benefits and services for economically vulnerable groups (women, seniors, persons with disabilities, and Aboriginal communities). The Bloc QuÈbecois is a federal party, but is based exclusively in QuÈbec and dedicated to QuÈbec's eventual independence from Canada. The Bloc calls for relatively generous social provision, but does not advocate any form of guaranteed income (Bloc QuÈbecois, n.d.).
The one party at the federal level that does express interest in guaranteed income (but does not yet have elected Members of Parliament) is the Green Party. In early 2008 this party was attaining unprecedented double-digit levels of public support in national surveys of voters' preferences (Harris/Decima, 2008).11 The Green Party leader, Elizabeth May, has expressed her personal support for the idea of guaranteed income and has initiated discussion of the concept within her party (Delacourt, 2007). The Greens are considering the idea of a "Guaranteed Livable Income (GLI) for all" as a way to "eliminate poverty and allow social services to concentrate on problems of mental health and addiction" (Green Party of Canada, 2007, p. 84). The Green's GLI would be provided "to every Canadian without regard to a needs-test." It would be "regionally set at a level above poverty, but at a bare subsistence level to encourage additional income generation," and would be taxable for higher income earners. The Green Party Vision document cautions that the GLI concept "needs time for study, reflection and greater support from all three levels of government," and adds that this examination of the GLI concept does not preclude "pursuing short-term measures to make progress in the near term". But the Green Party also sees GLI as a potentially fundamental reform of income security measures in Canada.
Various "poverty-industry" programmes of welfare, disability pensions, seniors benefits, unemployment insurance, would all be collapsed within one simple single payment system, administered through taxes (Green Party of Canada, 2007, p. 84).
There is also a lone voice in the Conservative Party ‚ Senator Hugh Segal ‚ who is very publicly calling for a guaranteed income. Segal is broadly perceived as a "red Tory," and has been an influential presence in his party for many years. He was actually appointed to the Senate by the previous Liberal government before its loss of power in early 2006. In the Canadian Parliamentary system, appointed Senators serve until age 75, so unlike elected Members of the House of Commons they are not subject to the short-term pressures of the electoral cycle. With this independence, Senator Segal has gone against the prevailing political discourse on income support measures and called for a guaranteed annual income for everyone in Canada (Segal, 2006).
In February 2008, Segal introduced a notice of motion in the Senate calling for "a fulsome study on the feasibility of a Guaranteed Annual Incomeäor Negative Income Tax as a means of reducing poverty and providing a real solution to those currently living below what is considered the Canadian poverty line." Segal wanted the Committee undertaking this study to "consider the best possible design of a negative income tax" that would meet the following criteria:
1. ensure that existing income security expenditures at the federal, provincial and municipal levels remain at the same level;
2. create strong incentives for the able-bodied to work and earn a decent living; and
3. provide for coordination of federal and provincial income security through federal-provincial agreements.12
Thus some signs of change are in the air in the political discourse on income security and social welfare in Canada. The Liberals, NDP, and Bloc QuÈbecois are calling for more generous provision through existing income security and public service programs that would at least partially reverse several years of cuts and retrenchment. However none of the parties that currently sit in the House of Commons are calling for universal or unconditional income security measures, nor are they departing from their assumption that labour market attachment is the sine qua non of economic security for the bulk of people in Canada. The federal Green Party (that in early 2008 still had no elected Member of Parliament in Canada's first-past-the-post electoral system) stands alone in its stated intention to consider moving in the direction of Guaranteed Livable Income as a way to fundamentally restructure the income security system in Canada. There is also a move afoot in the Senate of Canada to study guaranteed income.
When international academic debate about BI began in the 1990s, it was launched to a large extent by political philosophers interested in human freedom, redistributive justice, and political empowerment. Relatively quickly thereafter, this international debate brought in social scientists, political activists and public officials interested in pragmatic questions of BI design and implementation. In Canada, however, these philosophical and pragmatic debates about the merits or drawbacks of the BI model have been underdeveloped and truncated. What Canadian debate has occurred has been largely in reaction to specific practical models for income guarantees that have been advanced in government reports. For instance, the Macdonald Commission's model for a Universal Income Security Program received wide exposure in the mid-1980s. Unfortunately, this proposal set benefit levels at a very low level and advocated doing away with existing social programs, and so gave the concept of guaranteed income quite a bad reputation among progressive movements and within left-leaning social policy organizations.
One hopes that the re-emerging interest in the concept of guaranteed income in Canada will lead to a more informed, open-minded, and nuanced debate this time around. Notwithstanding the possibility of such a renewed discussion, there seems to remain in Canada significant ideological antipathy and philosophical objection to the concept of an income guarantee that is universal, unconditional, and adequate to support a modest but decent standard of living. Many policy experts and opinion leaders in Canada argue that such a model contradicts mainstream Canadian social policy assumptions and broader social values. Such BI and GAI sceptics from various points across the political spectrum defend the inviolability of the work ethic. They also continue to put faith in the potential of the labour market (perhaps shaped to operate in a kinder, gentler fashion, and to maximize the development of human capital) to provide adequate economic security for all. Whatever the ideal merits of a BI or GAI model may be, such an approach continues to be a hard sell in Canada.
What follows is an exploration of some of the possible roots of these Canadian objections, categorized according to primary lines of arguments in favour of BI that have been advanced internationally.
Van Parijs (1995) was the political philosopher who was largely responsible for initiating interest in the BI model with his left-libertarian view of the importance of "real freedom for all." This philosophical grounding for BI resonates only partially and imperfectly with the hybrid nature of the Canadian welfare state, as a creation of both social-democratic and liberal political tendencies in a country that has an overwhelmingly laissez-faire capitalist economy and is closely tied to the hyper-capitalist economy of its major trading partner, the United States. Canada's political tradition lacks the more strongly left-leaning political legacy of many European countries, where radical socialist parties and movements have had more impact historically and have actually attained or shared governing power at times. Political views in Canada also tend to be less libertarian and individualist than those found in the United States. Canadians tend to put more stock in collectivist solutions to social problems and needs, as opposed to the provision of direct benefits to individuals by a government that is relatively hands-off.
Canada's experiments in taming capitalism have been reformist and moderate, and based on social-democratic incrementalism rather than socialist attempts at transformation of economic relations and structures. Social democratic governments have only achieved power at the provincial level in Canada, never at the federal level. Especially in recent decades, these left-leaning provincial governments of the New Democratic Party (NDP) have adopted very modest goals in regard to reforming the capitalist economic order. Public ownership of the economy has been limited to specific sectors such as resources, utilities, and automobile insurance. Enhanced social provision and modest redistributive measures were set in place, notably the provision of universal medical and hospital care that was pioneered in Saskatchewan and launched nationally by the federal government in the 1960s. However, and especially in recent years, provincial NDP governments (in British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Saskatchewan) have tended to occupy the broad centre of the political spectrum, and have only appeared somewhat left-leaning due to the dramatic lurch to the right of other parties. It is certainly true that the NDP, whether in power provincially or in opposition at both federal and provincial levels, has shown virtually no interest in big schemes for economic redistribution or in specific models of guaranteed income.
The architecture of Canada's welfare state was set out by Leonard Marsh in his Report on Social Security for Canada, originally released in 1943 (Marsh, 1974). This model, similar to the Beveridge model of social welfare being advanced in the United Kingdom, featured social insurance programs for male breadwinners, safety net programs for those outside the labour market, extensive government services in areas such as health and housing, and a full employment economy achieved through Keynesian economic intervention. This social welfare model was championed from the opposition benches in the House of Commons by the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation [CCF], a democratic socialist party that preceded the NDP, during the war and early post-war years, and later by its successor the NDP when it exercised strong influence in minority Parliaments in the 1960s and 1970s. By the mid-1970s, this Beveridgean model emphasizing social insurance and collective public programs had been implemented to a significant degree.
A notable component of this model was the universal public health insurance for medical and hospital care referred to as "medicare," which was pioneered earlier by the CCF provincial government in Saskatchewan. After medicare's adoption on the national level it came to be seen as an iconic program by people across the country. It is sometimes portrayed as the "social railroad" of the 20th century that tied the country together, not unlike the railroad of steel built in the 19th century. Canadians' strong attachment to medicare would seem to indicate that they are much more enamoured with collective service provision (in this case, of health care) than they are with income support provided to individuals (who have often been construed as undeserving or lazy). This orientation to social programs as providing a collective good within a relatively unrestrained capitalist economic order has resonated ideologically with the dominant federal Liberal Party, and also with the now defunct Progressive Conservative party13 that was until 2003 the major national party that alternated in power with the Liberals. This is a very different philosophy, needless to say, from the idea inherent in BI that significant economic redistribution should occur to ensure freedom and security for all, regardless of their status in the labour market.
Researchers informed by republican political theory have recently been examining BI from this theoretical vantage point (e.g., RaventÛs, 2008). Casassas (2007) argues for a strong version of republican theory as a justification for BI. The republican tradition revolves around the idea that freedom requires the enjoyment of a certain set of material assets granting individuals socioeconomic independence from others. This material independence constitutes a necessary condition to build and consolidate individuals' positions as free choosers ‚ their capacity for making choices in all domains of life with the security that, thanks to a particular social and institutional design, nobody will have the remotest chance of arbitrarily interfering in their individual life plan decisions.
Such a republican justification of BI certainly resonates in many liberal democracies. But in a somewhat superficial but psychologically important way, a republican justification for BI initially sounds strange to Canadian ears. Since the Canadian system of government is a constitutional monarchy in the British Westminster model, people actively involved in politics as well as the broader citizenry tend to equate "republican" with "doing away with the Queen" as the head of state. This thin notion of republicanism in Canada tends to impede interest in or understanding of a thicker understanding of republican political theory, i.e., that the state should be under the active control of citizens keen to realize freedom from domination, protection of their rights, and access to resources necessary for the exercise of their civic responsibilities.
To be sure, the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the 1982 Constitution gave Canada a "bill of rights" that is usually associated with more republican systems such as the United States.14 Nonetheless, Canadians both inside and outside of politics still tend to see the state as being "the Crown." The British Queen and her representative in Canada, the Governor-General, embody the Head of State even though subject to constitutional checks and balances and obliged to heed the advice of the elected government in Parliament. The idea that government is a creation of the people ‚ and that we as citizens have the right to demand that our government redistribute resources to everyone as a practical condition for realizing civic rights and responsibilities ‚ is a way of thinking that has only muted and partial resonance with mainstream political traditions in Canada. For instance, the early republican argument by Thomas Paine (1797) that all citizens are entitled to a share in the collective wealth of society as a stake of land or money, paid out in a lump sum to the young or in regular instalments to the old, sounds quite strange to Canadian ears. As a constitutional monarchy, Canada has the historically entrenched consciousness that the default owner, so to speak, of society's wealth is the Crown. Land that is not privately owned is referred to as "Crown land," government-owned enterprises and institutions are called "Crown corporations," and fees levied by government on private sector firms that harvest or extract natural resources are referred to as "royalties."
In this last example, it is interesting to compare the Canadian case of resource royalties being paid to the Crown (albeit a figurehead, with the actual political power and control over resources residing in an elected government) with the Alaskan case of oil and gas revenues being paid into a Permanent Fund that pays out annual dividends to state residents. Notwithstanding all the constitutional and legal complexities surrounding control over and taxation of natural resources, the Canadian popular consciousness holds an unquestioned conception that natural resource wealth accrues to the government (Crown) rather than directly to citizens. Canadians expect their governments at all levels to be good stewards of this revenue and to use it wisely for the public good. On the other hand, the Alaskan arrangement resonates with the Americanrepublican notion that government is a creature of and directly accountable to citizens; this conception implies that individual members of the polity should have some direct access to the wealth of society, in addition to the unfettered enjoyment of their private wealth and property. A partial BI drawing on resource revenue seems to fit conceptually with the Alaskan political consciousness, but appears to be a significant conceptual leap within the Canadian mentality.
This difference could conceivably lessen, depending upon possible changes in political culture (e.g., if Canadians became more comfortable with individual entitlement as a political imperative), and upon the course of actual debates about policies and laws governing the resource sector (e.g., more public anger develops in Canada about very profitable companies paying very low royalty fees on non-renewable resources). However it still appears that constitutional monarchies (like Canada) and more republican forms of government (such as Alaska) start with quite different assumptions about who ultimately controls societal wealth and how decisions should be made about sharing it.
The rise of second wave feminism in the 1960s led to a broad reassessment of social policy that took patriarchy, gender roles, and women's paid and unpaid work into account. BI, along with many other aspects of social welfare policy, has come under feminist scrutiny. It has both opponents and proponents among feminist writers and researchers. Some feminists see BI's unconditionality as having the potential to create a domestic labour trap, in which many women will forgo their recently improved access to the job market and careers (e.g., Orloff, 1990 as cited in McKay, 2005, p. 109). Robeyns (2001, p. 113) contends that "[i]f a BI is implemented without any other social policy changes, there will be both positive and negative effects." The positive outcomes would include the following:
the recognition of unpaid work and care labour as valuable contributions to life, the increased flexibility of choice between different kinds of labour (home or on the labour market) and the financial support for single parents and housewives. Women without earnings might experience an improvement of their intra-household bargaining position (Robeyns, 2001, pp. 113‚114).
Robeyns (2001, p. 114) also points to BI's possible negative outcomes for women, if it is implemented in isolation from other social policy changes designed to achieve women's equality. These undesirable outcomes could include the reinforcement of traditional gender roles, a drop in income if BI benefits are less than income from most paid jobs, and the loss of the nonmonetary social rewards of labour market participation. Robeyns cautions that if BI causes the (presumably voluntary) withdrawal of many women from the labour force, women still doing paid work may suffer "spillover effects like statistical discrimination and the reinforcement of gender roles expectations and gender hierarchies". She concludes that "to do real and full justice to women, a BI should be supplemented with other social policy measures that liberate women (and at the same time men) from gender role expectations" (Robeyns (2001, p. 114).
Carole Pateman (2004, p. 100) puts the feminist case for BI in the broader context of labour market changes such as the casualization of paid employment and the downward pressure on wages in the global economy, and of the need to rethink gender roles, marriage, citizenship rights, and work. Pateman contends that the time is right "to look critically at old arrangements ‚ including the moral hazard of institutions that give incentives to men to avoid their fair share of the unpaid work of caring for others", and cautions that "women's freedomähas received rather short shrift in discussions of a basic income" (Pateman, 2004, p. 100). Ailsa McKay (2005, p. 111) sounds a similar cautionary note, saying that "existing literature focusing on a [Citizen's Basic Income] as a possible welfare reform strategy is lacking in rigorous feminist analysis, which is disappointing considering the potential such a proposal has for promoting gender justice."15
Feminist calls for a form of guaranteed income that would benefit women have also been heard, but only to a limited extent, in Canada. In the past, the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) was the leading feminist umbrella group in English-speaking Canada and represented a broad range of organizations and constituencies. NAC favoured guaranteed income as a step toward justice and equality for women. However NAC has lost federal funding in recent years, due in large measure to its previous high profile and effectiveness in advocating feminist positions with the media and politicians. With the waning of NAC's influence, a major organizational proponent in Canada that used a feminist analysis for guaranteed income has fallen silent.
NAC's francophone counterpart is La FÈderation des femmes du QuÈbec (FFQ). FFQ (2008a) points out that the right to a decent standard of living is part of the la Charte des droits et libertÈs du QuÈbec, but it is contained in a Charter section that is not justiciable and therefore does not provide an effective legal guarantee against poverty. FFQ actively participates in campaigns against poverty and for women's economic autonomy. It also staunchly defends collective public measures for women's equality. In 2008, when the Opposition Leader Mario Dumont called for a $100 weekly payment to families in QuÈbec with children under five years old who are not enrolled in the public child care system, FFQ strongly opposed this proposal. The FFQ (2008b) argued that such a policy would impede labour-market entry for women ‚ thereby increasing women's poverty ‚ and would undermine the highly developed child-care system that was a source of pride for QuÈbec.
The Canadian Feminist Alliance for International Action (FAFIA) seeks to "further women's equality in Canada through domestic implementation of its international human rights commitments."16 FAFIA examines how Canadian social programs could more closely approximate expectations set out in international documents such as the United Nations Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. FAFIA addresses various issues of importance to women, including federal and provincial cost-sharing of social programs, pay equity, child care, housing, and family violence prevention. FAFIA has called for the adoption of a new Canada Social Programs Act to govern federal transfer payments to provinces for income support. Such legislation would "set out funding formulas and standards, specify the programs and services that the CST is intended to support, and establish monitoring and accountability" (Day and Brodsky, 2006, p. 16).
Such measures would fill in the gap left by the federal government's repeal of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) in 1995. At that time, and in a panic to eliminate the federal deficit, the Liberal government totally abandoned CAP standards (originally adopted in 1966) for federal cost-sharing of provincially delivered income security and social support programs for the economically vulnerable. Day and Brodsky (2006, p. 7) point out that CAP "standards were significantly incomplete," but that they did approximate a guarantee of economic assistance to the poor in Canada through the articulation of these standards. These standards included accessibility (granting financial aid or other assistance to any person in need), adequacy (providing an amount that is consistent with a person's basic requirements), universality (waiving any residency requirements), the right to appeal decisions of welfare agencies, and restraints on the imposition of work requirements upon those receiving social assistance.
Articulating, adopting, and implementing such a set of standards for the complex network of federal income-security programs, and doing so in cooperation with the 13 provincial and territorial governments who deliver most of these programs, would be a complex undertaking. A complicated strategy such as national standards for income security as advocated by FAFIA begs the question. Perhaps a feminist strategy for economic security for Canadian women would be more coherent, and in the long run more effective, if an unconditional and universal guarantee of adequate income for all were one of its first premises. Should feminists ‚ as well as other progressives in social policy groups, the labour movement, and other organizations who seek better economic security for all ‚ adopt a more radical commitment to guaranteed income? Such a clearer and conceptually simpler model might, at least in the longer run, offer greater hope of achieving some positive practical outcomes.
Recently in Canada there has been an upswing in curiosity about and receptivity to the idea of an adequate and comprehensive guaranteed income. For instance focus groups conducted in Saskatchewan in 2005, comprised of poor people and antipoverty advocates, expressed at least qualified support for guaranteed income when they tackled this subject (Mulvale, forthcoming). These focus group participants expressed strong views that the current welfare system is broken, that the principle of universality in social programs still enjoys broad support, and that guaranteed or BI is worth considering in the Canadian context ‚ provided that it is implemented in a cautious, careful and flexible manner.
Other expressions of interest in basic or guaranteed income have been emanating from a variety of points across Canada. Local groups have emerged in certain cities.17 A conference in Saskatchewan in June 2007 entitled "Economic Security for All in Saskatchewan: Weaving an Unbreakable Social Fabric" developed a policy statement that called on the provincial government to "develop and implement a BI supplement as the first step toward a universal BI program in Saskatchewan" in conjunction with protection of and improvements in universal public services and targeted measures such as disability supports, child care, and social housing.18 Starting in mid-2007, the National Anti-Poverty Organization has been leading a cross-country discussion of guaranteed or citizen's income for Canada, using primarily conference calls and on-line forums. Another national group that has picked up on the growing interest in guaranteed income is Citizens for Public Justice, an interfaith Christian organization. It is calling for a "guaranteed liveable income (GLI) [that] would ensure that everyone has access to the basic necessities of life, while respecting dignity and encouraging participation in society" (Citizens for Public Justice, 2008, p. 1).
Making progress towards some sort of guaranteed income for Canada will depend upon building and connecting these points of interest and support, and at the same time recognizing that not everyone has exactly the same vision of what they want to achieve and how they want to get there. Even in progressive circles and on the political left in Canada, fear persists (that is not without some historical grounding) that certain versions of GAI would leave working people and the poor worse off than they are now. As always in Canada, practical progress towards guaranteed income would have to navigate the labyrinth of constitutional jurisdiction and division of powers between the federal government and the provincial and territorial governments in regard to who does what and who pays. Part of this challenge would be to accommodate QuÈbec's distinctiveness, perhaps in an asymmetrically federalist or cofederalist framework of governance.
The Canadian way in past social policy development has been to move forward in incremental, pragmatic and fiscally prudent steps in implementing new programs ‚ and this will likely be the way forward for guaranteed income as well. There are certainly no glimmerings on the horizon that Canada will implement a full-fledged BI anytime soon. But there may be political openings for fostering the development of a tapestry of programs that would approximate a guaranteed income framework. Such a framework could include unconditional income support, improved labour market access and mobility, and robust public services. It could also include emergency financial support programs for those in dire immediate need, especially if more universal income guarantees are delivered through time-delayed negative income tax mechanisms. As a first pragmatic step in moving toward a GAI, a federal legislative guarantee could be adopted that would set an income floor below which no one is to fall.
So the details of a workable scheme for guaranteed or BI in Canada have yet to be worked out. For instance, how would such a guaranteed income scheme articulate with (or perhaps serve as a partial replacement for) other income maintenance programs? How would it mesh with the taxation system? The costs of alternative guaranteed-income schemes also need to be determined. These cost projections would need to recognize that current levels of poverty in Canada are partly the result of the current dysfunctional social welfare system, and that not alleviating poverty will result in continuing and perhaps escalating costs being borne in other sectors such as health, criminal justice, education, and child welfare systems.
Like other countries, Canada has sustained ideological attacks by the political right on the welfare state in recent decades. Neoconservative forces have delegitimized social programs designed to redistribute wealth and to promote equality and justice for women, racial minorities, and others. Neoliberal forces have fueled the cry for wide and deep tax cuts, thereby diminishing public revenue streams and making social programs less affordable. These powerful discourses lead many to believe that something like a guaranteed income in Canada is ill-advised or unattainable.
However there are also signs that the ideological ground is currently shifting in Canada. There is evidence of growing concern about the persistence of poverty and the growing levels of inequality in Canada, and there is a growing belief that government needs to take steps to address these problems (CCPA, 2007). Hugh Segal, a prominent member of the Senate of Canada, has been very publicly calling for study of a guaranteed income scheme of national scope (Segal, 2008). Two national political parties in the federal Parliament (the Liberals and the New Democrats) are making poverty reduction an issue of importance in their platform for the upcoming federal election, and the Green Party of Canada is calling for investigation of a universal guaranteed income. The discourse on economic security in Canada may be changing.
Economic insecurity and inequality remain serious and seemingly intractable problems in Canada. This reality, coupled with the increasingly more apparent failings of the existing welfare state, has meant that the idea of guaranteed income is resurfacing among social policy advocates and in political circles. This idea of guaranteed income is not a new one in Canada, but in fact has cycled through social policy debates at various times in previous decades. There are some aspects of the Canadian political and ideological context (especially outside QuÈbec in English-speaking Canada) that make guaranteed income a difficult concept to sell in the marketplace of public opinion. These challenges include the country's lukewarm social-democratic commitment to redistributing wealth created in a capitalist economy, the limited impact (at least so far) of republican arguments that citizens are entitled to the economic means for individual and collective self-determination, and the limited impact of feminist calls for economic justice for women as a basis of gender equality.
Time will tell if the idea of guaranteed or BI takes hold in Canada, and if practical progress is made towards implementing such a scheme. Proponents of more universal and unconditional approaches to economic security in Canada will need to continue to mobilize, do critical analysis and careful research, and to develop and execute effective forms of political advocacy if such changes are to occur.
1 This definition of BI as advanced by Van Parijs has been little known and poorly understood in Canada, at least until recently.
2 My focus in this article will be primarily on developments in those parts of Canada where English is the predominant official language (i.e., all of Canada other than QuÈbec). I also reference the discourse in QuÈbec concerning "l'allocation universelle" or "le revenu garanti." To date, unfortunately, there has not been much interchange between the two linguistic communities on this subject.
3 A comprehensive narrative of the historical evolution of the Canadian welfare state is found in Dennis Guest (1997).
4 Another significant aspect of the economic security framework in postwar Canada was the launch in the 1960s of universal public health insurance, which provided medically necessary doctor and hospital care for all, and thereby staved off financial calamity for many.
5 Another aspect of welfare state retrenchment in Canada was the disappearance of federal government from the social housing field in the 1990s. Shapcott (2007, p. 9) points out that "Canada is the only major nation in the world without a comprehensive and properly-funded national housing strategy." The lack of adequate and affordable housing in Canada has resulted in high rates of homelessness and near-homelessness.
6 Such blueprints have come from the Canadian Council on Social Development (Scott, n.d.); Campaign 2000 (Freiler et al., 2004); the Caledon Institute of Social Policy (Battle et al., 2006; Torjman, 2007); and the Task Force on Modernizing Income Security for Working-Age Adults (MISWAA, 2006).
7 While feminists wanting to end the economic dependence of women upon men would see financial freedom to leave a marital relationship as a good thing, conservative family values proponents might see this as a disadvantage.
8 The other major recommendation arising out of the Macdonald Commission, free trade with the United States, was achieved in 1989.
9 See http://www.ccsd.ca/events/2003/conf_es.htm.
10 "Income Guarantee Deserves New Look," http://www.thestar.com/comment/article/175460.
11 The Green Party was the preferred choice of 12% of Canadian voters surveyed on March 27, 2008. The party had been hovering around the 10% level during the preceding period of 13 months (Harris/Decima, 2008), compared to a popular vote of 4.5% in the 2006 federal election.
12 Quoted from a "Communique" and "Notice of Motion" released by the Office of Senator Hugh Segal, Senate of Canada, February 6, 2008.
13 In 2003 the Progressive Conservatives merged with the Canadian Alliance Party (based largely in Western Canada) to form a new Conservative Party of Canada. Dropping "Progressive" from the party name was significant. The newly merged party has a much stronger right wing platform, and wants to see the federal government largely extricate itself from social programs.
14 Even in regard to the Charter, Canadian legal and political traditions tend to be more supportive of negative rights (freedom from interference in the exercise of civil and political rights) than they are of positive rights (basic entitlements to economic and social resources). In its 2002 decision in the Gosselin case, the Supreme Court of Canada did not recognize social and economic rights under the Charter's Section 7 on legal equality or Section 15 concerning security of the person (see Young, 2007, pp. 2‚4).
15 There is also a feminist argument that BI could also give women the financial wherewithal to leave abusive relationships (Mulvale and Delaney, 2006).
16 See http://www.fafia-afai.org/en/about.
17 See, for example, Livable Income for Everyone (http://www.livableincome.org/) in Victoria, British Columbia, and Citizen's Income Toronto (http://www.citizensincome.ca/resources.html).
18 See "Declaration of Principles and Actions Steps," which developed from this conference, at http://www.uregina.ca/arts/justice-studies/esc/resource_material.html.
References
James P. Mulvale Department of Justice Studies University of Regina 3737 Wascana Parkway Regina, Saskatchewan, S4S 0A2 Canada Email: jim.mulvale@uregina.ca